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Firm Characteristics and Country Institutional Development: 
Business Relationships with Foreign Firms in Transition Economies 
 
ABSTRACT 
The composition of firms' foreign business networks has been attended to in 
recent research but has seldom been subjected to empirical study in 
transition economies. In this study, we test hypotheses related to the 
composition of firms' foreign business relationships. First, we suggest that 
firms' characteristics matter for building a network of ties the foreign 
agents. Then, we consider the moderating effect of the degree of 
institutional development of the home country to assess to extent to which 
firms' foreign business relationships in transition economies are affected by 
the institutional development. We conduct a set of logistic regressions and 
one OLS regression to investigate the composition of firms' business 
relationships using firm-level data from 24 transition economies. The results 
indicate that firm size and membership in trade associations are good 
predictors of foreign business relationships – specifically, relationships with 
foreign investors, customers, and suppliers - and also of the diversity of 
foreign relationships. The country's institutional development radically 
changes which firms' characteristics matter in forming business 
relationships. 
 
Keywords: transition economies, foreign relationships, types of ties, 
institutional development 
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INTRODUCTION 
The firms' ability to establish business relationships is a major pre-
condition for survival and expansion. Business relationships provide firms 
with access to various types of resources, information, market access, and 
innovation opportunities (Lipparini & Sobrero, 1994; (Jack & Anderson, 
2002, Oviatt & McDougall, 1995). Business relationships are also 
instrumental in obtaining legitimacy, social status, reputation and social 
endorsement (Stuart et al., 1999; Human & Provan, 2000; Podolny, 2001). 
Firms establish different types of business relationships for different 
purposes (Hite & Hesterly, 2001), such as to access financial capital (i.e., 
relationships with financiers), to commercialize outputs (i.e., clients), or to 
access inputs (i.e., suppliers). A large body of research on networks, 
alliances, and entrepreneurship, has noted the benefits of these 
relationships (Birley, 1985; Stuart et al., 1999; Jack & Anderson, 2002) and 
suggested that firms' characteristics are important determinants of their 
networks (Fontes & Coombs, 1997) and how these networks evolve in 
response to resource needs (Hite & Hesterly, 2001). Research on transition 
economies has also noted that firms' ability to establish connections is a 
precondition for survival and prosperity (Roth & Kostova, 2001; Cernat & 
Vranceanu, 2002) in conditions of institutional upheaval. 
In transition economies, foreign business relationships may be far 
more critical than in western countries because of the institutional voids 
that underlie ineffective and inefficient local institutions. In the face of 
institutional failure and overcome domestic insufficiencies, firms may 
replace formal with informal relationships (Roth & Kostova, 2001 ), or seek 
foreign relationships to overcome supply and/or demand insufficiencies. 
However, in transition economies the transaction costs are particularly high 
due to market uncertainties, legal and judiciary ineffectiveness, and political 
unrest. During the transition period, the local firms' ability to develop 
relationships to foreign agents (clients, financiers, suppliers, and partners) 
may be critical to access a variety of resources and markets that transcend 
the local political boundaries. That is, ties to foreign firms may be more 
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than an option for growth for firms in transition economies, they may be the 
solution for survival, hence warranting this and subsequent studies.  
In transition economies, firms' characteristics may be the main 
drivers of business relationships, as they seem to be in western countries. 
That is, while firm characteristics may matter, as suggested, for example, 
by networks, strategic alliances and entrepreneurship researchers, these 
characteristics matter to a far larger extent in transition than in western 
countries (i.e., more institutionally developed countries). Moreover, in the 
context of transition economies, firms' characteristics are likely to be 
moderated by the degree of development of these countries' institutional 
environments (i.e., the countries advancement in the transition process) in 
determining the types of ties that local firms hold to foreign agents.  
In this study, we examine transition countries' firms business 
relationships to foreign firms. We test hypotheses relating firms' 
characteristics to the likelihood they carry foreign business relationships. 
The link between firms' characteristics and their foreign ties has been 
implicitly advanced in extant research but has not been exposed to 
empirical testing. Partly, this may be because most recent research tends to 
take the point of view of the foreign multinational that is entering a 
transition country, rather than the point of view of the local firm. 
Specifically, we test empirically, on a sample of firms from 24 transition 
economies how the types of ties to foreign firms (i.e., composition of firms' 
business networks) vary for firms with diverse characteristics. We then 
examine the impact of the institutional development in the transition 
countries on the importance of firms' characteristics as antecedents of their 
networks of foreign relationships. That is, we study whether and how the 
degree of institutional development is likely to diminish the influence of 
firms' characteristics on the firms' ability to have ties to foreign firms. The 
two research questions are thus: How do firms’ characteristics in transition 
economies influence the likelihood of having business ties to foreign firms? 
How does the degree of development of the institutional environment 
influences the above relationship? Our results provide strong evidence for 
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an important moderating effect of the institutional environment, thus 
supporting the need to study firms in transition economies. 
The remaining of this study is structured in three main sections. The 
first section entails a brief literature review anchored in the traditional idea 
that firms' characteristics are primary antecedents of their business 
networks. Then we introduce the moderating effect of institutional 
development. The third section develops the empirical method and includes 
the description of the data, variables, statistical procedures, and results. We 
conclude with a thorough discussion of the results, implications, and 
avenues for future research.  
FIRMS' CHARACTERISTICS AND BUSINESS NETWORKS 
 It is important at the outset to define that we refer to the composition of a 
firm's network refers as the types of business relationships of the firm, or 
the types of organizations that are included in the firms' business networks 
(Baum, Calabrese & Silverman, 2000; Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer, 2000). 
Specifically, we refer to the portfolio of members and the roles they play as: 
clients, suppliers, investors, and financiers. We restrict our analysis to ties 
to foreign firms, as recent research has examined how firms substitute 
formal by informal ties within the domestic setting (Roth & Kostova, 2001).  
 
WHY DO BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS MATTER?  
Recent research on firms networks has noted that both the structure 
and composition of firms' networks of business relationships play a 
significant role in economic activity in general, and specifically for firms' 
survival, and success (e.g., Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986, Birley, 1985, Dubini & 
Aldrich, 1991, Hite & Hesterly, 2001, Human & Provan, 2000, Jack & 
Anderson, 2002, Jarillo, 1989, Larson, 1991). Business relationships 
facilitate the access to various types of resources (Lipparini & Sobrero, 
1994), markets (Gulati, 1998, Hite & Hesterly, 2001), information (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998), detection of new opportunities (Birley, 1985), legitimacy 
(Human & Provan, 2000, Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999), innovation 
opportunities (Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997), and reputation and social 
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endorsement (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). These inter-firm business 
relationships improve the focal firms’ ability to survive and succeed, permit 
firms to focus on their core competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990), and 
minimize the constraints imposed by eventual resource limitations.  
The institutional failure and ineffectiveness in transition economies is 
likely to lead to a reconfigurations of business ties. According to Roth and 
Kostova (2001) firms, in these instances, substitute formal with informal 
relationships. However, the transaction costs involved in engaging in 
exchanges with firms in transition economies are substantial. Transaction 
costs increase due to, for example, market uncertainties, legal and judiciary 
ineffectiveness, and political unrest. Meyer (2001) recently noted that 
"institutions reduce transaction costs by reducing uncertainty and 
establishing a stable structure to facilitate interactions. However these rules 
are not in place during transition." The implementation of market, political, 
legal, financial and social reforms to support the transition from a 
communist state to a market-based economy has been a lengthy process in 
the majority of the former socialist countries. These countries were forced 
to transform substantial parts of their economic system, to advance in the 
privatization process and on the liberalization of the economy (Fogel & 
Zapalska, 2001; Cernat & Vranceanu, 2002). During the transition period, 
the local firms' ability to develop relationships to foreign agents (clients, 
financiers, suppliers, and partners) may be critical to access a variety of 
resources and markets that transcend the local political boundaries. That is, 
ties to foreign firms may be more than an option for growth for firms in 
transition economies, they may be the solution for survival. 
How does network composition vary across firms? 
Extant research has highlighted some firms' characteristics that 
determine firms' ability to form business relationships, and along which the 
composition of their business networks should vary. These are 
characteristics related to firms' size, age, reputation and legitimacy, and to 
organizational factors such as the extent of formalization, transparency and 
control mechanisms that firms have in place. In a parsimonious view we 
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may aggregate these factors in three main dimensions: social, scope and 
organizational, as described below. Firms' characteristics have a direct 
bearing on all the three factors simultaneously, and in our classification we 
seek only to illustrate the mechanisms through which firms' characteristics 
are important for building a network of business relationships. For instance, 
prior research has suggested that there are significant differences in terms 
of organizational structure, market focus, strategy, and resource 
endowments between small and large firms (Mintzberg, 1979). Small firms 
seem to be more dependent than large firms on the personal and cohesive 
social relationships of the entrepreneur or top management team ( Low & 
MacMillan, 1988; Hite & Hesterly, 2001), such as their relationships with 
family members or friends, on which they rely to obtain resources, gain 
legitimacy (Lipparini & Sobrero, 1994; Human & Provan, 2000), and 
overcome the limitations of small size. Conversely, larger firms may seek 
business relationships for different strategic motives, such as innovation, 
market access, financial need, and so forth. Hence, firms' characteristics, 
such as size in this example, are likely to influence the composition of firms' 
business networks. 
Scope factors. Scope factors relate to the activity of the firm. These 
factors may entail the size, age, volume of activity and even the industry of 
the firm. Scope factors determine the extent to which firms are able to 
establish business relationships, and their dependence on these 
relationships. For example, smaller firms have smaller scope, and a limited 
pool of managerial, financial, informational, and human resources 
(Stinchcombe, 1965; Beamish, 1999). Therefore, small firms may need to 
rely more on their business networks to overcome resource and 
informational constraints and improve their likelihood to survive and 
succeed (Birley, 1985, Jack & Anderson, 2002). Small firms' business 
networks expose these firms to information and resources not yet held, 
hence providing growth opportunities. Conversely, firms with a larger 
volume of activity require a more varied pool of business relationships to 
absorb their output (i.e., relationships with clients), to supply a more 
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diverse set of inputs (i.e., relationships with supplier), and even to face 
higher financial capital needs (i.e., relationships with financiers such as 
banks). Furthermore, the larger the scope, the more the firms are forced to 
search outside their traditional geographical boundaries and seek business 
relationships in foreign countries, or with foreign agents, to satisfy the 
input-output needs. 
 An alternative explanation for why small and large firms may have 
substantially different networks relies on their search capabilities. Small 
firms seem to rely more on cohesive  and informal relationships because 
their search capabilities are limited to the neighboring landscape (Hite & 
Hesterly, 2001) and small firms are less likely than large firms to be aware 
of the full range of financing possibilities. This may signify that small firms 
lack the ability to search for, for example, financing opportunities outside 
their local (regional or national) area. Conversely, large firms possess more 
resources, broader search capabilities, and more knowledge on various 
mechanisms, namely on the procedures to obtain foreign financing.  
Firm age has also been argued conceptually to influence the 
composition of their business network (e.g., Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Huang, 
Li & Ferreira, 2003). For example, older firms may have larger experience 
and resources to build their business relationships with various agents. 
Hence, size and age, possibly among other characteristics, influence firms' 
scope and their network of foreign business relationships. 
Organizational factors. These are factors comprising the formalization 
of firms' internal structures, systems for control and reporting, and so forth. 
Organizational factors contribute to increase firms' transparency and reduce 
exchange uncertainty for partner that seek these firms. For example, 
smaller firms are generally less formalized and often the image and 
personal ties of the entrepreneur are confounded with the image and ties of 
the firm (Birley, 1985; Dubini & Aldrich, 1991). Conversely, larger firms are 
generally more formalized and do not depend on single individual decision 
makers. Larger firms are also more likely to have external control and 
monitoring mechanisms that reduce potential exchange uncertainties and 
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transaction hazards for partners by reducing managers' discretionary 
decision making (Huang, Li, & Ferreira, 2003).  
The firms' size often brings added formalization. For example, large 
firms may need to seek financing in capital markets (i.e., go public), which 
bears significant monitoring by external agents, institutional investors, and 
financial regulation institutions (Aggarwal & Rivoli, 1991). Therefore, 
contrary to small firms, large firms are likely to have more formal exchange 
governance mechanisms (i.e., relationships governed by contracts) and to 
be perceived as having higher legitimacy and reputation and stable 
operations due to their increased transparency, which facilitates formal ties 
with other firms. 
Social factors. Social factors include elements associated with the 
firms' legitimacy, reputation, social endorsement, status, etc. For example, 
smaller firms are more likely than larger firms to lack social resources. 
Small firms, and also new firms, frequently lack influence, endorsement, 
perception of quality, reliability, reputation and legitimacy (Boeker, 1989, 
Larson, 1992); as a result other firms may hesitate to have relationships 
with small firms (Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999). For example, Singh et al. 
(1986) and Baum and Oliver (1991) noted that new firms are perceived as 
riskier and as having higher failure rates than established firms. Small firms 
will also find it difficult to attract financial capital from external sources due 
to the perceived risk ( Singh, House & Tucker, 1986; Baum & Oliver, 1991). 
Older firms possibly have developed a networks of business relationships 
that may serve as good referrals of its resource base, acquired legitimacy, 
and corporate strategy (Human & Provan, 2000) and highlight that they are 
trustworthy and capable. Firms lacking endorsement and legitimacy may 
seek reputation building affiliations such as membership in trade 
associations to enhance their reputation, legitimacy, endorsement, and 
extend their information channels. Furthermore, membership in trade 
associations also exposes the firm to foreign contacts (e.g., participation in 
trade fairs, and other events). In yet other instances, the selection of the 
location may serve to build legitimacy, as is the case when firms locate in 
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well identified locations of excellence, or in larger cities. Finally, firms with 
current or prior connections to the government may also benefit from 
higher perceived status. The support of the government reduces 
transactional uncertainties such as possibly happens for firms that are 
state-owned, but also for firms that were privatized.  
In sum, all the above three factors of firms' characteristics - scope, 
organizational and social - contribute, in general, for the formation of 
business relationships, and also for the formation of different types of 
business relationships with foreign firms. Not only these factors determine 
whether the focal firm will seek foreign ties, but also the likelihood foreign 
firms will be willing to exchange with local firms. Hence, these three factors 
provide an aggregation of the motivations that drive both the local firm and 
the foreign firm to form a business relationship. In fact, because foreign 
firms will have an even higher difficulty in evaluating the focal firm's status, 
track record of performance, and trustworthiness than other domestic firms, 
it would seem reasonable that local firms' characteristics could serve as 
referrals in face of institutional insufficiencies. These characteristics 
decrease, for example, the uncertainty associated with the focal firm's 
management, legitimacy, reputation, trustworthiness, quality, meeting 
deadlines, and use of firms' funds.  
Hypothesis 1. Firms' characteristics (size, age, ownership status and 
membership in trade association) are positively associated to business 
relationships with foreign firms.  
 The hypothesis above could be decomposed in a set of parallel 
hypotheses advancing a positive relationship between each of the firm's 
characteristics selected and the likelihood it will be able to develop a 
business tie to a foreign firm. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
 In this section we add the second component of our model -- the 
degree of institutional development in the host country -- to understand 
how the degree of institutional development influences firms' ability to 
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establish business relationships beyond the direct effect of firms' 
characteristics. Institutional development is a good indicator of how far 
transition economies have evolved in their transition from a centrally-
planned system towards a market-based system, and the hurdles already 
overcome (EBRD, 2000). The transformation towards a market-based 
economy is the most salient feature of transition economies (Meyer, 2001; 
Roland, 2001).  
One manner to understand firms' business relationships in transition 
countries is to examine the effect of institutions in reducing transaction 
costs (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Meyer, 2001). According to North (1990), 
market efficiency is partly determined by the surrounding institutional 
environment and the extent to which it supports economic activity. Well 
developed institutions reduce search, negotiation and contracting costs, and 
the uncertainties involved in inter-firm exchanges and set a stable structure 
for supporting legal, regulatory and political infrastructures and agencies 
that protect firms (e.g., their proprietary assets, the enforceability of 
contracts) and facilitate exchanges (Meyer, 2001). However, there is little 
evidence that in spite of the different institutional environment, firms' 
business relationships are substantially different in transition economies 
from those expected to be found in more institutionally developed western 
countries. Notwithstanding, some scholars have provided interesting 
insights on how business networks may vary. For instance, Roth and 
Kostova (2001) found that firms tend to replace formal by informal ties 
when facing institutional voids, and Peng (2000) suggested that local 
business networks are particularly useful when formal institutions are weak. 
In none of these studies, however, have the authors focused on business 
networks with foreign firms. 
Partnering with other organizations may be an effective way to 
minimize transaction costs, increase market power, promote learning, share 
risk (Larson, 1992; Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000; Lu & Beamish, 2001), 
obtain endorsement (Stuart et al., 1999), or favor the access to an array of 
resources, as we discussed previously. In transition economies, specifically, 
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given the institutional upheaval (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Roth & Kostova, 
2001) it is particularly important to examine firms' business relationships 
because these relationships are likely to determine how these firms 
overcome an array of market imperfections, survive and prosper (Meyer, 
2000). This is because inter-firms relationships may be an alternative to 
"absent" institutions, or to informal ties (Roth & Kostova, 2001). 
Furthermore, business relationships may be based on more than resource 
dependencies and be actually a strategy (Hite & Hesterly, 2001). As a 
strategy, some business relationships are proactively sought as a manner 
to, for example, guarantee a smooth ride through the transition period. If 
this is the case, not only we may expect to see firms with different 
characteristics engaging in dissimilar network arrangements, but we would 
also expect the business environment of the firm to favor some types of 
ties, rather than others. That is, the characteristics of the firms may be 
primary determinants of the composition of their networks but this 
examination needs to be placed in context. Transition economies highlight 
the context whereby the degree to which countries have evolved through 
the transition process may render some types of ties more likely than 
others. In sum, the institutional development of each country influences the 
types of ties established by local firms with foreign firms. As either firms or 
environments change, so should firms networks.  
 Foreign firms face potentially high transaction costs when engaging in 
exchanges with firms from transition countries. They lack information on 
local firms, they have to deal with evolving and often fuzzy regulations, with 
inefficient judicial systems and with under-legislated activities. Furthermore, 
foreign firms need to deal with corrupt officials and inefficient financial 
systems, weak protection of proprietary assets, and complex interventions 
in foreign activity in the host country (Meyer, 2001). The more 
institutionally developed the host country, the lower these transaction costs. 
The institutional development of these countries in transition is likely to 
affect the extent to which foreign firms need to rely on the local firms' 
characteristics as alternative indicators of lower transaction costs, reliability 
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and legitimacy. Underdeveloped institutional environments increase the 
costs of doing business, augment unfamiliarity, and increase informational 
demands. More developed institutional environments have models of 
organization of labor and ways of doing business that are more westernized. 
Hence, firms' characteristics may be themselves the references for potential 
foreign business agents in the face of institutionally underdeveloped 
environments.  
Hypothesis 2. The level of institutional development moderates the impact 
of firms' characteristics on the likelihood of having relationships with foreign 
firms, such that the less institutionally developed the country the more 
important are firms' characteristics.  
 We advanced two main hypotheses on how the composition of firms' 
business network may vary as a direct influence of firms' characteristics, and 
with the moderating influence of the level of institutional development. We 
propose that institutional development reduces the importance of firms' 
characteristics for the formation of foreign ties because it reduces 
transactional costs. Then, the less institutionally developed the transition 
economy the more salient should be firms' characteristics. We test these two 
hypotheses in the following section. It is worth noting, at this stage, that this 
analysis departs substantially from prior research that tends to assume the 
point of view of the foreign firm that seeks to enter a foreign country. Here 
we look at the conditions that ease a local firm establish relations with 
foreign firms. 
 
METHODS 
Sample and Data Collection 
The data used in this study was drawn from a survey conducted by 
the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) to over 4,000 firms in twenty six transition economies 
during 1999-2000. The survey and data are publicly available in the series 
Business Enterprise Environment Survey1 (BEEPS survey). We excluded 
                                                 
1 Survey and dataset accessible at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
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surveys of firms with large missing data, of state-owned firms, and of non-
profit organizations. We also excluded firms from Turkey and Rep. Serpska 
because we do not have comparable data concerning the institutional 
development in these two countries (countries not included in the EBRD's 
Transition Report 2000). Our final sample is composed of 3,087 firms from 
twenty four countries. The countries included are: Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic*, Estonia*, 
Georgia, Hungary*, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia*, Lithuania*, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Poland*, Romania, Russia, Slovakia*, Slovenia*, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan (* signals countries that joined the European Union 
in 2004). 
Measures and Variables  
Dependent variables. Foreign firms serve one of four roles: foreign 
firms may be investors/partners in the focal firm, may be clients, suppliers, 
or financiers (i.e., foreign banks). The distinction among the possible types 
of ties is warranted because different types may have different sensitivity to 
transaction costs and to the degree of development of the institutional 
framework in transition economies. Although firms also develop business 
relationships for other purposes, such as innovation and R&D purposes, 
these are less likely to matter in the short term for firms in transition 
economies, are not available in the dataset, and are not examined in this 
study. We coded six dependent variables to assess the ties to foreign firms.  
Foreign relationships was coded as a dummy variable representing 
whether a firm has any business relationships with foreign firms. To 
distinguish the specific types of foreign relationships, we also coded four 
additional variables assessing whether the firm had any of the following four 
main types of foreign business ties: 
Foreign customers was coded as a dummy variable representing 
whether a firm had a relationship with a foreign client. Firms in transition 
countries have significant benefits from interfaces with foreign customers 
for technological learning, to speed their internationalization, and to detect 
market opportunities in foreign countries. However, the development of 
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relationships with foreign clients is likely to be, at least partly, dependent on 
their perception of the focal firms' likelihood of survival, its credibility, and 
capacity to meet its obligations.  
Foreign suppliers. Foreign suppliers provide opportunity to overcome 
local inefficiencies in the markets for intermediate inputs. Procuring inputs 
in foreign countries also provides larger control over timings, quantities, and 
qualities, as well as a cost arbitrage advantage and increased 
competitiveness. Organizational factors, such as external monitoring 
mechanisms that reduce managers' discretionary decision making without 
significant control from external agents and institutions (Huang, Li, & 
Ferreira, 2003) decrease the perceived risk of doing business with transition 
firms, namely in what concerns payments to suppliers, meeting deadlines, 
and the use of firm's funds to fulfill responsibilities. Larger production scope 
increases the search for foreign suppliers and the membership in trade 
associations increases the focal firms' exposure to potential foreign 
suppliers. This variable was coded as a dummy variable with 1 indicating 
that the firm has at least one relationship to a foreign supplier. 
Foreign investors/partners. Firms often seek foreign investors to 
overcome inefficiencies in the capital markets at home. Foreign investors 
are important to support firms' expansion, particularly when the personal 
acquaintances and the local financial institutions are unable to meet the 
capital needs (Meyer, 2000). For example, larger focal firms are generally 
better established in the market, accumulated experience and built a track 
record of successes, have higher internal formalization, and tend to adopt 
transparent internal decision-making that may attract foreign investors' 
interest. Similar to previous, this is a dummy variable. 
Foreign financial firms. Foreign financial firms (banks) are important 
sources of financial capital to firms, and more so in less industrialized 
economies (Weller & Scher, 2001). Foreign banks are unlikely to finance the 
operations of small firms, except in limited, and specific, situations of a 
provable track record of, for example, innovative performance. Small firms 
are also less likely to need foreign financing. Growing firms are likely to 
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'calculatively' (Hite & Hesterly, 2001) establish ties to co-opt financial 
service firms, and alleviate financial resources dependence (Pfeffer, 1985; 
Rowley, Behrens & Krackhardt, 2000; Hite & Hesterly, 2001). Firms in 
transition countries seek foreign financiers to overcome structural and 
transactional market imperfections. Moreover, foreign financial firms are 
more likely to get involved with firms with higher scope, higher social status 
and developed internal organization. This is a dummy variable. 
 We also calculated the foreign diversity of the firms' business ties, 
assessing whether a local firm carried, simultaneously, multiple types of ties 
to foreign firms. This variable varies from 0 (no foreign relationship, no 
diversity) to 4 (diversified with all four types of foreign relationships).  
Independent and control variables. Although firms may be 
characterized along a rather extensive set of dimensions we restrict our 
examination to a few indicators that capture well the three factors 
previously mentioned: scope, social and organizational. Our selection was 
also restricted by data availability. We defined firms' characteristics along 
their size, age, membership in trade associations, and ownership status 
(private or privatized state-owned enterprises). Firm size is a categorical 
variable measured by the fixed assets2 and ranges from 1 (fixed assets less 
than $250,000) to 10 (fixed assets greater than $500 million). Firm age 
was constructed as the difference between the firm's founding year and 
2000. Age in our sample varies from 1 to 194. Membership in trade 
associations is a dummy variable capturing whether the firm is member of a 
trade association. Membership in trade associations may be indicative of an 
external focus. Finally, we coded the origin of the firm as a dummy variable 
(Privatized firm) which equals 1 if the firm resulted from the privatization of 
a previously state-owned firm, and 0 if the firm is private since inception. It 
is possible that private and privatized firms have different sets of 
capabilities, namely capabilities to search inside and outside the country for 
business contacts. 
                                                 
2 Similar results were observed when we utilized the volume of sales and the number of 
employees as alternative measurements of firm size.   
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To capture the extent of these countries institutional development we 
used a similar measure and procedure to Meyer's (2001) "institutional 
building". This variable is an unweighted average of ten dimensions 
evaluated by the EBRD: large scale privatization, small scale privatization, 
government restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange 
system, competition policy, banking reform & interest rate liberalization, 
securities market & non-bank financial institutions, legal transition in 
commercial law, legal transition in financial regulations. The values indicate 
the cumulative progress in the movement from a centrally planned economy 
to a market economy in each dimension, rather than the rate of change in 
the course of the year. The higher the score the higher the transition 
towards a market-based system. Data for this variable was extracted from 
the EBRD's transition report 2000.  
Controls. We included three control variables. We controlled for the 
firm's location as the size of the city where it is located. We classified the 
city as large if it has more than 250.000 people or if it is the country's 
capital.  We control for industry3 by including a dummy variable for 
manufacturing (1) or service (0) firms. We also included a country control 
as the GDP to control for wealth variations across nations. This data was 
collected from the World Competitive Index database. 
 
RESULTS 
Tables 1 & 2 provide summary descriptive statistics and correlations 
of all variables. Although there are a number of significant correlations, 
none is high enough to raise concerns on multicollinearity (Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham, & Black, 1995). We also used the variance inflation factors (VIF) to 
test for multicollinearity. None of the VIF scores approached the commonly 
accepted threshold of 10 used to indicate potential multicollinearity hazards. 
[ Insert Tables 1 & 2 about here ] 
                                                 
3 Although a disaggregation would be desirable this is not permitted given the data 
used. 
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The results of the regression models used to test the hypotheses are 
presented in Tables 3.1~3.6. The dependent variables capture whether the 
focal firms have a certain type of business relationship (client, supplier, 
investor, and financial support) with foreign companies. We conducted five 
sets of logistic regression tests for each of the following dependent 
variables: foreign relationship, foreign investor, foreign customer, foreign 
supplier, foreign financial stake. We also conduct one OLS regression with 
diversity of foreign ties (foreign diversity) as the dependent variable. These 
models allow us to examine the impact of the firms' characteristics on the 
probability of occurrence of a certain business relationship, as we 
hypothesized. With the significance level at 99%, our logistic regression 
models were significant as indicated by the models' Chi-square values.  
[ Insert Tables 3.1 ~ 3.6 about here ] 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that firms' characteristics affect the likelihood 
of having foreign relationships. We modeled the following firms' 
characteristics: size, age, membership in trade association, location and 
ownership form. Firm size was found to be significantly related to the 
formation of foreign relationships (βs are positive and statistically significant 
at p< .001 in Model 2s, Tables 3.1 ~ 3.5). We conclude that larger firms are 
more likely to have foreign business relationships with foreign investors, 
customers, suppliers and financial capital providers. Larger firms also have 
a more diversified portfolio of foreign business relationships (β=0.187, p< 
.001, in Table 3.6). The firms' membership in trade associations also 
heightens the likelihood of having all types of foreign relationships 
individually (βs are positive and statistically significant at p< .01, in Model 
2s of Table 3.1 ~ 3.5) and a diversified pool of foreign relationships 
(β=0.301, p<0.001, in Table 3.6).   
The firms' age only affects the likelihood of carrying relationships with 
foreign investors and foreign customers. The firms' age is negative 
associated with the likelihood of relationships to foreign investors (β=-
0.011, p<0.05, in Model 2 of Table 3.2), but positively associated with the 
likelihood of relationships to foreign customers (β=0.10, p<0.01, in Model 2 
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of Table 3.4). Finally, whether a firm is private from inception or a 
privatized state-owned enterprise does not seem to affect substantially the 
likelihood of carrying foreign relationships, beyond ties to foreign investors 
(in Table 3.2).  
Hypothesis 2 argues for a moderating effect of a country's 
institutional environment on the relations advanced in Hypothesis 1. 
Compared with the association between firm size and/or trade association 
membership and its foreign relationships, it seems that the causality 
between a firm age and/or privatization form and its foreign relationships is 
more sensitive across different institutional environments. This is evidenced 
by statistically significant coefficients of the interaction terms between firm 
age and its foreign relationships in Tables 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.6 and those 
between privatization form and the firm's foreign linkages in Tables 3.1~3.4 
and 3.6.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study contributes to the social network literature by investigating 
the composition of firms' business network regarding network members and 
types of ties but primarily to the international business literature by 
exploring firms' business relationships within country contexts. In this 
regard we present an interesting exploration of the firms' business networks 
in transition economies.  We sought to understand which, and how, are the 
main determinants of business ties to foreign companies, and how the 
institutional environment may moderate the effects of these determinants in 
transition economies. We show that some firms characteristics are 
important predictors of their ability to establish foreign business 
relationships. We argued that ties to foreign agents are both an outcome of 
resource needs and of the ability to attract foreign agents. That is, firms' 
characteristics mitigate transaction uncertainties and serve as a referral to 
foreign agents. We also suggested that the more developed the local 
institutional environment, the less important should be firms' characteristics 
because more developed institutional environments reduce the transaction 
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costs involved in exchanging with firms in transition economies. 
Institutionally developed environments offer guarantees for dispute 
resolution and transparency that do not require relying on firms' 
characteristics. 
 Which firms' characteristics drive the ability to form foreign ties? Our 
results indicate that the size of the firm and its membership in salient trade 
associations are good predictors of the ability and/or willingness to have 
foreign business relationships – specifically, relationships with foreign 
companies as investors, customers, and suppliers. These same 
characteristics increase the ability to hold, simultaneously, ties to various 
types of foreign agents. Membership is trade associations may be an 
indicator of both internal and external orientation. The firms' age only seems 
a good predictor of the ability to capture foreign clients and investors. 
Finally, privatized firms, possibly in virtue of the privatization process, seem 
to have more foreign investors than private firms from inception, but do not 
attract more foreign clients, financiers, or suppliers.  
 When studying transition economies it is important to uncover how 
the institutional environment influences firms' strategies, structures and 
business ties. Table 4, above, summarizes the results of regressions 3.1 to 
3.6. Our tests of the moderating effect of the state of development of the 
local institutional environment reveals a fundamental aspect: an almost 
absolute reversal of the firms' characteristics that matter for establishing 
foreign business relationships.  The significant coefficients of firms' size and 
membership in trade associations (direct effects) are positive, but the 
coefficients of the interaction terms with institutional development lose 
significance. In turn, the interaction term raises the significance of age and 
ownership. That is, the more institutionally developed the country, the more 
important become firms' age and ownership status. Age is probably a good 
indicator of stability, visibility, reputation and legitimacy (social factor) but it 
may be also indicating that older firms have ties to the government. In this 
regard age and ownership may share some overlap. Ownership status is 
important as privatized firms may have developed a political capability of 
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engaging with the government officials and with agencies that, even if they 
are no longer under the direct management of the government, are likely to 
replicate their previous patterns of action and maintain favoring previously 
state-owned firms. For example, the banks, although some may have been 
privatized, are probably managed by the same individuals and still favor 
state-owned, and predictably, the privatized firms. However, more 
fundamentally, it seems that the more institutionally developed the country 
the easier it is for private firms to establish relationships to foreign firms. 
Perhaps the institutional effectiveness and efficiency are the determining 
factors because they ease the normal functioning of private firms. The more 
institutionally developed the country, the less likely the government will 
maintain a pervasive intervention in private economic activity. 
 Hence, as we predicted, our tests present evidence that the state of 
development of the local institutions significantly affects local firms' ability to 
establish foreign ties. Seemingly, it is not so much a question of reducing 
the influence of firms' characteristics, as indicators of legitimacy, and 
performance, but rather the complete alteration of which factors matter. It is 
also likely that foreign firms may be more willing to transact with firms in 
countries that are more institutionally developed because more developed 
environments reduce the transaction costs and the information 
requirements. Foreign firms may now rely on institutions that are "in place" 
to arbitrage and resolve potential conflicts and protect, for example, 
intellectual property. 
 We also assessed whether firms' characteristics could predict the 
diversity of ties. Our measure of diversity is a simple count of the types of 
foreign relationships that a firm may hold to different types of foreign agents 
(investors, suppliers, customers, and financiers). We found that size and 
membership in trade associations are the strongest predictors of more 
diversified foreign relationships. Firms and governments in transition 
economies may consider this finding when designing strategies and public 
policies. For firms we have clear evidence of the benefits of participation in 
trade associations, for public policy we show that governments ought to 
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promote the creation of these associations and collaborate in exposing local 
firms to foreign firms.  
 An interesting, even if not completely surprising, result of our 
empirical tests is the effect of the location on firms' establishment of foreign 
relationships. Given that access to economic agents is important in 
establishing business relationships, we included the size of the city in which 
the firm is located and noted that generally the larger the city the more 
likely the firm has relationships to a variety of foreign agents. As could be 
expected, larger cities are more likely to have more abundant and effective 
institutions, offer greater exposure to potential foreign contacts, and ease 
establishing connections to other agents. Institutions tend to evolve faster in 
larger, and more cosmopolitan urban spaces than in the more rural, and 
traditionally more conservative spaces. Hence, even within each country we 
observe different degrees of transition towards a market-based system.  
It is worth mentioning the relatively low, but positive, correlation 
between age and size. This may reflect the profound transformation that is 
occurring in the transition economies as they move from a centrally-planned 
to a market-based model. Although firms' age varies to a maximum of 194 
years, the mean age of the firms in our sample is about 9 years old; which 
under most conditions signifies relatively young firms. Firms at this age may 
still suffer from a liability of adolescence. Notwithstanding, the recent 
economic and political evolution -- with mass privatizations of former state-
owned firms -- in transition countries may be causing this low correlation 
and be, in fact, a natural outcome when studying firms from transition 
economies. 
 Finally, although foreign firms seem to be increasingly investing in 
some transition countries, particularly in Hungary and the Czech Republic, 
foreign firms are still more important as clients and suppliers than as 
investors or financiers. This may be changing as a growing number of firms 
seek transition countries to relocate their more labor-intensive activities. 
Foreign investment, however, is likely to increase rather exponentially as 
foreign investors see conditions of stability and effective institutions. The 
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mere fact that some of these countries were expected to join the European 
Union (which some did in 2004) may account for some inter-country 
variations, and will predictably induce the formation of more ties to foreign 
agents.  
The study of firms business relationships with foreign firms is 
important, among other issues, because these relationships may affect the 
national ability to reconstruct and innovate. For example, local firms that 
have business relationships predominantly to other national firms are likely 
to engage primarily in local search behaviors (March, 1991; Levinthal & 
March, 1993) which hinders the ability to introduce major modifications in 
the technological trajectories of the country (Kogut, 1991). Conversely, if 
local firms have business ties that span the national boundaries it is likely 
they may engage in a mix of exploitation and exploration of various 
technological trajectories (Kogut, 1991). It is true nevertheless that, at 
least to some extent, firms' characteristics will determine the degree to 
which they are able to engage in geographical boundary spanning searches. 
For example, small firms are likely to be constrained to local searches 
(Lipparini & Sobrero, 1994), because their ties tend to be also local and less 
diverse, as our results highlight. Conversely, large firms are more likely to 
have broader ties and be able to explore locally and beyond the local 
boundaries (both domestically and internationally). Large firms also larger 
resources to commit to those searches.  
While we noted that our results have some implications for public 
policy in terms of promotion of trade and industry associations, we may also 
conclude that governments really ought to commit efforts in advancing as 
fast as possible through the transition period. In particular, in developing 
the institutions that make markets more transparent and effective. For 
example, these may be the capital markets, the agencies for regulation of 
competition, the legal and judiciary system, and so forth. For firms, our 
results illustrate that firms characteristics matter probably because these 
characteristics reduce cognitive uncertainties that foreign agents may have. 
Firms may decrease those uncertainties in multiple ways such as joining 
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other firms in associations, collaborating with higher status firms, and more 
generally by increasing the transparency of their internal (e.g., 
organization, decision-making processes) and external processes (e.g., 
reporting systems, accessing funds in the capital market). 
Limitations and additional research avenues. This study is based on 
a cross-sectional analysis and the data available permits us only to 
characterize the situation in a single point in time. Future research can set a 
longitudinal test of how the firms' business networks evolve. Moreover, the 
data restricts our examination to only a few firms' characteristics, while a 
larger set of dimensions would be desirable. Scholars have questioned the 
reliance on executives' recall of previous company issues. For instance, 
Golden (1992) suggested that retrospective reports of organizational 
phenomena may be inaccurate. Miller, Cardinal and Glick (1997) responded 
to Golden's critique by showing that retrospective reporting is a viable 
research methodology if the measures used are adequately reliable and 
valid. Retrospective reports have been commonly used in strategic 
management and organization theory research. Nevertheless, further 
research could substantially advance our understanding by using primary 
data specifically dedicated to support this line of research rather than 
publicly available data with its inherent limitations. Finally, it is also worth 
noting that we only examine direct ties and the types of foreign partners. 
Further insights might be obtained by examining the specific functional 
composition of the network - such as ties for R&D, specific supply 
components, distribution channels, and so forth. Our data does not support 
these analyses. An immediate research question may be, for example, how 
do the business networks influence R&D, innovation outcomes, 
specialization and business scope?   
Additional research may assess whether the formation of business 
relationships is cumulative. Firms gradually build up their image as 
successful, reliable, and legitimate, which enhance their attractiveness as 
partners for client, supplier and/or investor business relationships. 
Therefore, it may be that prior affiliations provide endorsement and 
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increase the likelihood that the firm will be able to develop business 
relationships with other organizations in the future. For example, business 
relationships with prestigious foreign firms are likely to signal quality, 
managerial ability, stability, ability to fulfill deadlines, honor payments and 
agreements. Therefore, future research may advance our understanding on 
the extent to which the firms' current network of business relationships is a 
determinant of their future network composition. We were able to assess 
whether prior ties to the government (which is the case of privatized firms) 
facilitate foreign ties, and found that this is not substantially the case. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The study of the composition of firms' business network with foreign 
firms contributes to our understanding of the idiosyncrasies of firms' 
interactions in transition economies. The extent to which firms in different 
countries seek collaborative and stable ties contributes to their innovative 
capabilities, to survive and prosper in unstable environments, and to 
expand beyond the boundaries of both the current pool of business 
relationships and of national political borders. Business networks are 
important both in centrally planned and market-based economies because 
they facilitate inter-firm exchanges (Mattson, 1999; Meyer, 2000). Firms in 
all types of economic systems procure inputs and place outputs through 
business ties to other firms, with whom they engage in more or less stable 
patterns of dyadic or networked interaction.  
In transition economies firms' business network with foreign agents is 
important to conceptualize how firms overcome uncertainties and limitations 
imposed by environmental changes and severe institutional and economic 
transformations. In the former centrally planned economies business ties 
served to connect firms to different government-controlled institutions, but 
the government pervasiveness in economic activity is gradually decreasing 
as more firms and services are privatized. Business networks serve in both 
types of economic systems to obtain better deals and to overcome both 
structural and transactional market insufficiencies, possibly beyond the 
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exclusive effect of institutional development. Therefore, a main question 
may not be whether institutions matter, but rather how firms in transition 
economies seek to overcome institutional insufficiencies through ties to 
foreign firms, and whether and how the transition from a central plan to a 
market-based economy endeavors substantial changes in the firms' 
business network. 
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations 
 
Variable N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Foreign relationship 
(FRELATIONS) 2978 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Foreign investor 
(FINVESTOR) 3082 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Foreign supplier 
(FSUPPLIER) 3082 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Foreign customer 
(FCLIENT) 3079 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Foreign financial 
(FFINANCE) 2945 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Foreign diversity 
(DIVERSITY) 2928 0.73 0.99 0 4 
Firm size (SIZE) 2772 2.11 1.90 1 10 
Firm age (AGE) 3038 9.41 14.31 1 194 
Privatized firm 
(PRIVATIZED) 3087 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Member of trade 
association (MTA) 3087 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Institutional 
development (INSDEV) 3087 3.21 0.51 1.93 4.10 
City size (CITY) 3087 3.29 1.76 1 6 
Industry  3059 0.50 0.50 0 1 
GDP (constant 1995 
US$, in trillions) 3087 0.08 0.1 0.002 0.33 
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Table 2. Correlations matrix 
 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Foreign relationship 1.000              
2 Foreign investor 0.469* 1.000             
3 Foreign supplier 0.822* 0.293* 1.000            
4 Foreign customer 0.620* 0.202* 0.519* 1.000           
5 Foreign financial 0.205* 0.197* 0.139* 0.139* 1.000          
6 Foreign diversity 0.861* 0.614* 0.826* 0.765* 0.369* 1.000         
7 Firm size 0.352* 0.228* 0.342* 0.365* 0.211* 0.436* 1.000        
8 Firm age 0.131* 0.024 0.135* 0.199* 0.087* 0.178* 0.324* 1.000       
9 Privatized firm 0.017 -0.064* 0.039* 0.113* 0.014 0.057* 0.252* 0.228* 1.000      
10 Member of trade 
association 
0.225* 0.122* 0.218* 0.205* 0.071* 0.251* 0.301* 0.151* 0.062* 1.000     
11 Institutional 
development 
0.131* 0.075* 0.113* 0.163* 0.065* 0.157* 0.195* 0.091* -0.095* 0.188* 1.000    
12 City size -0.227* -0.213* -0.191* -0.057* -0.060* -0.203* -0.048* 0.039* 0.191* -0.054* 0.031 1.000   
13 Industry -0.050* 0.023 -0.061* -0.200* 0.005 -0.099* -0.164* -0.150* -0.280* -0.020 0.126* -0.188* 1.000  
14 GDP -0.160* -0.071* -0.162* -0.132* -0.038* -0.157* -0.069* -0.051* 0.069* -0.055* -0.017 -0.035 -0.061* 1.000 
Note: *p<0.05 
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Table 3.1. Logistic regression models: Foreign relationships 
DV: Foreign relationship Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model  6 
CONTROL VARIABLES       
  City size -0.307*** -0.292*** -0.302*** -0.290*** -0.288*** -0.302*** 
  Industry -0.465*** -0.276*** -0.319** -0.317** -0.312** -0.319** 
  GDP -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES       
  Firm size  0.391*** 0.466* 0.364*** 0.366*** 0.375*** 
  Firm age  0.004 0.003 -0.078** 0.003 0.003 
  Privatized firm  -0.166 -0.121 -0.111 -3.057*** -0.117 
  Member of trade association  0.747*** 0.704*** 0.688*** 0.691*** 1.024 
  Institutional development   0.336* 0.042 0.055 0.310** 
INTERACTIONS       
  Firm size*Inst'l development   -0.027    
  Firm age*Inst'l  development    0.025**   
  Privatized firm*Inst'l 
development 
    0.932***  
  Member of TA*Inst'l development      -0.098 
INTERCEPT 1.219*** 0.073 -0.915* 0.015 -0.036 -0.827* 
N 2952 2620 2620 2620 2620 2620 
Chi-square 
281.42**
* 
612.35**
* 
622.51**
* 
633.70**
* 
642.53**
* 
622.53**
* 
Notes: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
Table 3.2. Logistic regression models: Foreign investor 
DV: foreign investor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model  6 
CONTROL VARIABLES       
  City size -0.367*** -0.357*** -0.362*** -0.361*** -0.356*** -0.361*** 
  Industry -0.115 -0.007 -0.027 -0.027 -0.029 -0.028 
  GDP -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES       
  Firm size  0.298*** 0.278 0.292*** 0.288*** 0.292*** 
  Firm age  -0.011* -0.011* -0.035 -0.013** -0.011* 
  Privatized firm  -0.473** -0.456** -0.453** -2.754** -0.457** 
  Member of trade association  0.389** 0.361** 0.363** 0.362** -0.035 
  Institutional development   0.136 0.095 0.015 0.106 
INTERACTIONS       
  Firm size*Inst'l development   0.004    
  Firm age*Inst'l development    0.007   
  Privatized firm*Inst'l 
development 
    0.702*  
  Member of TA*Inst'l development      0.119 
INTERCEPT -0.567*** -1.362*** -1.749** -1.609** -1.356** -1.657** 
N 3054 2708 2708 2708 2708 2708 
Chi-square 
158.01**
* 
278.52**
* 
279.87**
* 
280.14**
* 
285.13**
* 
280.08**
* 
Notes: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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Table 3.3. Logistic regression models: Foreign suppliers 
DV: foreign supplier Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model  6 
CONTROL VARIABLES       
  City size -0.270*** -0.249*** -0.255*** -0.244*** -0.240*** -0.257*** 
  Industry -0.510*** -0.304** -0.340*** -0.339*** -0.332** -0.338** 
  GDP -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES       
  Firm size  0.324*** 0.193 0.303*** 0.303*** 0.311*** 
  Firm age  0.004 0.003 -0.081** 0.002 0.003 
  Privatized firm  -0.080 -0.038 -0.034 -3.648*** -0.036 
  Member of trade association  0.715*** 0.674*** 0.663*** 0.665*** 1.311* 
  Institutional development   0.170 -0.002 -0.046 0.299** 
INTERACTIONS       
  Firm size*Inst'l development   0.036    
  Firm age*Inst'l development    0.025**   
  Privatized firm*Inst'l development     1.133***  
  Member of TA*Inst'l development      -0.193 
INTERCEPT 0.675*** -0.419** -0.883 -0.338 -0.218 -1.296*** 
N 3054 2708 2708 2708 2708 2708 
Chi-square 
248.18**
* 
524.02**
* 
531.57**
* 
542.61**
* 
561.24**
* 
532.07**
* 
Notes: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
Table 3.4. Logistic regression models: Foreign customers 
DV: foreign customer Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model  6 
CONTROL VARIABLES       
  City size -0.148*** -0.124*** -0.135*** -0.127*** -0.126*** -0.135*** 
  Industry -1.172*** -1.018*** -1.131*** -1.124*** -1.124*** -1.131*** 
  GDP -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES       
  Firm size  0.310*** 0.269 0.275*** 0.276*** 0.280*** 
  Firm age  0.010** 0.009* -0.040 0.008* 0.009* 
  Privatized firm  -0.015 0.087 0.089 -1.655* 0.088 
  Member of trade association  0.700*** 0.583*** 0.577*** 0.578*** 0.661 
  Institutional development   0.670*** 0.511*** 0.506*** 0.686*** 
INTERACTIONS       
  Firm size*Inst'l development   0.003    
  Firm age*Inst'l development    0.015*   
  Privatized firm*Inst'l development     0.536*  
  Member of TA*Inst'l development      -0.023 
INTERCEPT -0.024 -1.230*** -3.219 -2.711*** -2.698*** -3.271*** 
N 3051 2705 2705 2705 2705 2705 
Chi-square 230.38*** 505.47*** 546.67*** 550.85*** 552.40*** 546.68*** 
Notes: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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Table 3.5. Logistic regression models: Foreign finance 
DV: foreign financial Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model  6 
CONTROL VARIABLES       
  City size -0.198** -0.157* -0.172* -0.167* -0.171* -0.170* 
  Industry -0.087 0.428 0.377 0.384 0.382 0.382 
  GDP -0.002* -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES       
  Firm size  0.383*** 0.153*** 0.372*** 0.373*** 0.373*** 
  Firm age  0.008 0.007 -0.008 0.007 0.007 
  Privatized firm  -0.418 -0.396 -0.384 -0.089 -0.391 
  Member of trade association  -0.063 -0.140 -0.127 -0.131 0.035 
  Institutional development   0.109 0.292 0.357 0.350 
INTERACTIONS       
  Firm size*Inst'l development   0.065    
  Firm age*Inst'l development    0.004   
  Privatized firm*Inst'l 
development 
    -0.090  
  Member of TA*Inst'l development      -0.048 
INTERCEPT 
-2.683*** -4.189*** -4.417** -5.029*** 
-
5.243*** 
-5.219*** 
N 2920 2566 2596 2596 2596 2596 
Chi-square 15.07** 93.68*** 95.93*** 95.48*** 95.44*** 95.42*** 
Notes: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001     
 
Table 3.6. OLS regression models: Foreign diversity 
DV: foreign diversity Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model  6 
CONTROL VARIABLES       
  City size -0.134*** -0.108*** -0.111*** -0.109*** 
-
0.106*** -0.111*** 
  Industry 
-0.301*** -0.177*** -0.201*** -0.199** 
-
0.197*** 
-0.200*** 
  GDP 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
-
0.001*** 
-0.001*** 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES       
  Firm size  0.187*** 0.063 0.177*** 0.174*** 0.179*** 
  Firm age  0.002 0.001 -0.012 0.002 0.002 
  Privatized firm 
 -0.067 -0.043 -0.040 
-
1.028*** 
-0.045 
  Member of trade association  0.301*** 0.273*** 0.274*** 0.272*** 0.070 
  Institutional development   0.078 0.100* 0.594 0.139** 
INTERACTIONS       
  Firm size*Inst'l development   0.035    
  Firm age*Inst'l development    0.004*   
  Privatized firm*Inst'l development     0.312***  
  Member of TA*Inst'l development      0.062 
INTERCEPT 1.439*** 0.794*** 0.594*** 0.518*** 0.693*** 0.414** 
N 2903 2579 2579 2579 2579 2579 
R-square 9.26 26.69 27.30 27.34 27.72 27.23 
Notes: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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Table 4. Summary of results 
 
Notes: FR - foreign relationship, FC - foreign clients, FS - foreign suppliers, FI - 
foreign investors, FF - foreign financiers, FD - foreign diversity, ns - not significant. 
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